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TWO CHEERS FOR WARREN BURGER 
As Chief Justice, Warren Burger was widely respected by state 
judges and federal trial judges for his administrative skills. His judi-
cial opinions received a significantly less enthusiastic response. 
Among law professors, he has few admirers, many detractors, and a 
high reputation for mediocrity. In a witty commentary on his de-
parture from the bench, The New Republic compared him to Ted 
Baxter, the pompous anchorman on the old Mary Tyler Moore 
show. 
And yet, even Ted Baxter had his good days. So, too, with 
Warren Burger. Liberals who now despise him may someday recall 
him more fondly. Unlike his successor, William Rehnquist, Burger 
was not an inflexible ideologue. An interesting article could be 
written with the title "Warren Burger's liberal opinions." 
One of Burger's most memorable opinions was written in an 
environmental case, TV-4. v. Hill. 1 The case involved the construc-
tion of a dam that would imperil the snail darter, an endangered (if 
not particularly attractive) species of perch. Although the dam was 
almost complete at the time, Burger's opinion for the Court held 
that finishing it would violate the Endangered Species Act. The 
government argued that even if TVA was violating the law, the trial 
judge should have balanced the threat to the snail darter against the 
huge investment already made in the dam. Chief Justice Burger 
rejected this invitation to balance away a clear statutory violation. 
Instead, he said, the rule of law required that the judge issue an 
injunction against this illegal act. Justice Rehnquist, by the way, 
argued that the trial judge should have allowed TVA to violate the 
statute. 
Fullilove v. Klutznick2 was another major case in which Burger 
split from Rehnquist and joined the liberals. The case involved a 
set-aside for minority contractors. Burger upheld this fairly mild 
form of affirmative action as a proper exercise of Congress's power 
to promote racial equality. In another case, Burger upheld the am-
bitious remedial education program contained in a Detroit desegre-
gation decree. 3 Earlier, Burger had authored the Court's opinion in 
I. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
2. 448 u.s. 448 (1980). 
3. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). Justice Powell wrote separately, in an 
effort to limit the possible impact of the Court's holding. See id. at 292. 
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Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,4 which up-
held the power of federal judges to order widespread busing. In 
Reed v. Reed,s he wrote the first Supreme Court opinion ever to 
strike down a statute discriminating against women. And in Griggs 
v. Duke Power Co. ,6 Burger laid the foundations of modern employ-
ment discrimination law. 
Burger was perhaps most predictably conservative in the area 
of criminal procedure. Even there, however, exceptions can be 
found. In the Chadwick case, 1 for example, he wrote an opinion 
excluding evidence even though the police had probable cause for a 
search. The evidence was suppressed because, although the police 
had lawfully seized a footlocker, they had failed to get a warrant 
before opening it.B Once more, Rehnquist was in the dissent. 
The Burger Court is often chastised for its inconsistent opin-
ions, fragmented votes, and poor craftsmanship. The Chief Justice 
may well have been partially responsible for these problems. Yet, 
even here something can be said in mitigation. For example, early 
in Burger's tenure, he wrote the Harris opinion,9 which sharply lim-
ited the Miranda rule. Under Miranda, a confession cannot be used 
in court unless the defendant was given the proper warnings. Har-
ris carved a hole in this rule: the confession can be used if the de-
fendant takes the stand and gives testimony inconsistent with the 
earlier confession. The Harris opinion was attacked by leading 
scholars for its inconsistency with Miranda and its glaring defi-
ciency in judicial craftsmanship. Professors Alan Dershowitz and 
John Hart Ely said the opinion "in crucial respects, flatly misstates 
both the record in the case before it and the state of the law at the 
time the decision was rendered." In their view, each of the Court's 
arguments "masks a total absence of analysis and provides no sup-
port for its result." Burger's opinion, they said, exhibited "at best, 
gross negligence concerning the state of the record and the control-
ling precendents." 10 
The critics were undoubtedly right about Burger's failure to 
4. 402 U.S. I (1971). 
5. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
6. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Griggs holds that Title VII prohibits the use of employment 
criteria having a disproportionate impact on minorities, even though the employer had no 
intent to discriminate. 
7. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I (1977). 
8. In addition to Chadwick, see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 487 (1981) (Bur· 
ger, J ., concurring), for another notable example of Burger voting to overturn a criminal 
conviction on constitutional grounds. 
9. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
10. Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor 
and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1199 (1971 ). 
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reconcile Harris with Miranda. But, if The Brethren is to be be-
lieved, Burger's initial decision would have been more principled: 
he wanted simply to jettison Miranda. He was persuaded not to do 
so by Justice Harlan, who was concerned about the effect of an 
overruling on the Court's institutional credibility.JI Would 
Burger's liberal scholarly critics really have been happier if he had 
stuck to his original, more principled position? 
None of this means that Burger was a great Chief Justice or a 
closet liberal. He was a relatively untalented, quite conservative ju-
rist, with little flair for leadership. No John Marshall, to say the 
least. Still, we can do worse than mediocre. Under more talented 
leadership, the Court may yet produce the kind of cohesive majori-
ties, principled opinions, and high technical craftsmanship that 
were missing from the Burger Court. A more ideologically consis-
tent bench will find these virtues easier to achieve. But after a few 
years of the Rehnquist Court, perhaps some people will look back 
nostalgically on the good old days when the Burger Court muddled 
around, somewhere a bit to the right of center. 
D.A.F. 
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